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1.0 Jntroduct ioa 
Since i979 the Conservative Government has pursued a policy of moving state 
assets from the public sector to the private sector. This policy of 
privatisation has captured the imagination of economists and accountants in 
the UK and also abroad where governments of various political colours are 
adopting similar programmes (Hemming & Mansoor, 1988). In the USA Presldent 
Reagan proposed privatising airports and the railways, while in the Soviet 
Union and the rest of Eastern Europe perestroika reflects a desire to move 
away from state planning to greater dependence upon competitive markets and 
private enterprise. Recently the UK government has added a further 
dimension to its privatisation programme by proposing the introduction of 
quasi-independent agencies to undertake much of the work previously 
undertaken by civil servants in government departments (HMSO, 1988). 
Eventually the core civil service may shrink by over 80 percent from around 
560,000 to 60,000. Already the Professional and Executive Recruitment 
Regrster, the National Engineering Laboratory and the Crown Suppliers, for 
exampie, have been placed under the management of such agencies. 
Such a widescaie reform of the provision of services traditionally supplied 
by government departments, alongside the mainstream programme of 
privatisation, which by 389 had seen 64 firms privatised with assets 
totalling over 526 bn, raises an important question. To what extent does a 
change in organisational status affect performance and in what ways? 
Although there has been considerable investigation of the effects of 
takeovers and mergers on firms within the private sector (e.g. Meeks, 1977) 
and some study of the results of governmental reforms and nationalisation 
(e. g. Pryke, 1971)) the impact of changes in organisational status within 
the puoiic sector and involving the transfer of assets across the public- 
private boundary has been relatively neglected (Kay and Thompson, 1986). 
Recent research at the University of York has attempted to remedy this 
neglect by identifying the precise effects of a change in organisational 
status on performance and the sources of any performance change. Ic Earlier 
papers from this research programme considered performance changes using 
economic measures, name 1 y labour and total factor productivity and 
employment functions (Hartley, Parker and Martin, 1990; Parker and Hartley, 
1990) * This paper reviews the impact of changes in organisational status 
using a set of standard financial ratios and a sampie of UK organisations 
which experienced status changes in the post-war period, The ratios and 
sample are detailed in Section 2 of the paper. In Section 3 the hypothesis 
about the impact of organisational status on performance is set out and 
Section 4 details the statistical method used. The results are presented in 
Section 5, Finally, the conclusion, Section 6, summarises the results and 
outlines their implications for future research and public policy. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
l The research was funded by the ESRC as part of its Management in 
Government Initiative (proJect number E 0923006). The authors would like to 
thank Bob Lavers for statistical assistance; the usual disclaimers apply. 
2. The Ratlos and Ornanisations 
2.1 The financial ratfos 
In financial accounting, the effects of changes in organisational status on 
performance are usually considered in terms of financial status (solvency 
and liquidity>, stock market prices (the consequences for shareholders> and 
performance ratios which relate to how well a business is being run (Reid 
and Myddel ton, 1982, pp. 35-7) * However, since our study includes 
organisations which spent some or all of their time in the public sector 
where there are no traded shares, stock market ratios are inappropriate. 
Similarly, measures of solvency and liquidity - standard ratios take the 
form of debt to equity and interest cover - are difficult to interpret when 
an organisation’s finances are underwritten by government and there are no 
shareholder funds. Therefore this study considers performance ratios only. 
The specific ratios studied are intended to reflect the quality of 
management in terms of the efficient use of working capital, fixed assets 
and profitability. Our data came from each organisation’s annual reports 
and accounts, supplemented where necessary with information from internal 
accounts and papers. * 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t We would particularly like to thank the HMSO, London Regional Transport 
and the Royal Mint for giving access to internal papers. 
There is a large number of financial ratios covering almost all the various 
financial aspects of a business which can be computed from annual accounts 
(Court is, 1978). However, according to research by Laurent (1979), ten key 
ratios explained 82 percent of the variance in a complete set of 55 ratios. 
These ten ratios are: 
i. return on capital employed 
ii. gearing 
iii. management of working capital 
iv. fixed asset management 
V. revenue to shareholders’ funds 
Vi. quick assets to quick liabilities 
Vii. stock management 
viii.interest cover 
1X. reserves to net income 
X. revenue to debtors. 
We report on five of these ratios, namely profitability, working capital as 
reflected in stocks and debtors, and fixed assets, (i, iii, iv, vii and 
x) I excluding those which are not meaningful for public sector activities. 
Their interrelationship is illustrated in Figure 1 with the addition of 
indicators of labour efficiency* No attempt has been made to judge the 
significance of non-computed ratios from the significance of the computed 
ones. Differences in one ratio do not necessarily imply statistically 
signif icant differences in related ratios (Bayldon, Woods, and Zaf iris, 
1984). In more detail, the ratios computed were as follows: 
(a) Percentage return on capf ta1 employed (RUCE): measured as prof 1 t 
before tax and long-term financing charges in relation to average long- 
term capital employed (net assets) during each year. This is the most 
satisfactory measure of profitability for our purposes since it 
indicates the performance achieved regardless of the method of 
f !nanc ing. Sources of finance often changed dramatically following a 
status change. 
(b) Turnover to average net fixed assets employed per annum: this ratio 
indicates how well an organisation uses its physical capacity. The 
ratio provides information on the productivity of fixed capital albeit 
in a crude form because assets are valued at written down historic cost 
!n accounts. 
cc) Stocks (incl udfng work in progress) to turnover. 
;d) Debtors to turnover. Both the stocks and debtors ratios were used 
:a indicate performance in terms of managing working capital (‘making 
capital work harder’). Organisations should attempt to minimise the 
amount of working capital employed to achieve any given level of 
activity. End of year stock and debtor figures were used as these are 
reported in annual accounts, though they may not accurately reflect the 
average level during the year. Also, low stock and debtors ratios are 
not unambiguously advantageous. If stock levels are too low the 
DrOdUCtiOn process could be interrupted and if payment terms are too 
tight the business may lose sales to competitors offering more 
favourable credit terms. Both results would have the effect of reducing 
profitability. In general, we tkae the view that a decline in these 
ratios indicates an improvement in performance, although in summarising 
the results allowance is made for the possibility’that a change in 
these ratios in any direction may reflect improved performance. 
A major criticism of politically controlled bodies is that they do not 
employ optimal amounts of labour. More specifically they employ too 
mu;2 labour which remains underutilised and pay wages above competitive 
market levels (Parker, 1985; Mitchell, 1988). To test for this two 
further financial ratios were calculated: 
(e) Labour’s share in costs: this was approximated in terms of wages 
(and the associated employment costs of national insurance and 
pensions> in total expenditure. . A fall in the wages to expenditure 
ratio implies a ’ labour shake out’ and a movement towards market 
clearing wages. 
(b) Value added per employee: which is sales revenue (S) minus the cost 
of bought in goods and services (C) > divided by the numbers employed 
(NJ, In the absence of detailed Information on the costs of purchases, 
this was approximated as (P + I + W>/N where P = profit before tax, I = 
capital charges in the form of interest on long-term loans and. W = 
emp 1 oyees wages. P, I and W were expressed in real terms deflated by 
the non-food RPI. 
It would also have been useful to have analysed the trend in the ratios of 
overheads, administrative expenses and R % D expenditures in total 
expenditure or in relation to sales. These three ratios are likely to be 
affected by changes in organisational status. For example, administrative 
and other overheads might be expected to fall after privatisation if 
previously the organisation was over-bureaucratic (if it was under-managed 
previously the ratio might rise). Similarly, it is likely that research 
which did not promise a commercial return would be curtailed as the 
organisation became more interested in profitability and less interested in 
political goals. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to obtain sufficient 
data on these ratios to create reliable series for empirical work. 
-------------------- 
Figure 1 here 
-------------------- 
2.2 Data, trends and objectives 
Just as indicators of performance need to be selected with care the data 
used must be appropriate and comprehensive. Continuity of data is a problem 
in all tise series analysis, especially where new accounting methods occur 
part way through the period studied. Moreover, ‘opinion and judgment affect 
the reported profit and many of the balance sheet items’ for all firms 
(Reid and Myddelton, op. cit., p.44; also Mayer, 1988 for a critical review 
of accounting practices). Wherever possible, however, a continuous set of 
data were constructed by adjusting figures for earlier ,or later years to 
reflect accounting changes. In some cases it proved impossible to adjust 
in this way and the ratio is not reported. Also, in our analysis 
’ extraordinary 1 terns’ , such as revenue from asset sales, were not included 
where they distorted the performance figures. 
The study is primarily concerned with changes fn the trends of financial 
ratios associated with an organisational change. Such changes may occur in 
the same financial year as the organisational change (year t> or at some 
later date (ttn) owing to time lags affecting the relationship between the 
status change and performance. Also, performance changes might occur in 
anticipation of an organisational status change (in t-n): a phenomenon 
which appears to have been associated with privatisation in the 1980s 
(Hartley, Parker and Martin, 1990) * Research into the impact of 
organisational change must, therefore, identify effects within the time 
limits tdn. 
Other factors may affect performance around the time of a status change, 
notably changes in product market competition. Competition is an important 
incentive to be efficient and, indeed, may be more important than 
organisational status (Millward and Parker, 1983; Dunsire et.al., 1988). 
However, in most of the cases studied, significant changes in product 
market competition did not coincide with the organisational status changes. 
The except ions were British Aerospace, London Transport and the HMSO. 
Nationalisation of the UK aerospace industry in 1977 brought together 
three main suppliers of airframes and aero-def ence equipment; the 
liberalisation of bus transport in the 1980s led to more competition for 
London Transport; and for HMSO from 1982 the public procurement of 
government stationery was opened up to more competition. 
10 
Another possible complicating factor is ‘objectives’, In principle, a 
decision on whether performance improved or deteriorated can only be made 
once an organisation’s goals are clarified. For instance, maximising profit 
conflicts with maximising the volume of sales or sales revenue (Baumol, 
1959). Therefore a higher rate of return on capital is not unambiguously a 
’ good thing’ . It depends upon the organisation’s overriding objective. In 
the private sector pursuit of profit is more likely to be a key objective, 
though it is not necessarily the only one (Williamson, 1964; Harris, 1964). 
In the public sector the identification of organisational goals is 
especially relevant when appraising performance because profit may not be a 
goal at all. For example, according to their statutes nationalised 
industries were expected to supply ‘without undue discrimination’ and to 
‘at least break-even taking one year with another’. They were not expected 
to profit maximise and of ten they have been required to pursue other 
object lves such as maintaining employment, price stability and equity - 
targets (Coombes, 1971; Chester, 1975). A change in a performance ratio 
following an organisational change may therefore reflect a change in 
object!ves rather than a change in efficiency. This is most likely to be a 
problem when interpreting rates of return on capital (i.e. profitability). 
For examp 1 e, the privatisation of a public sector monopoly might be 
associated with higher profitability as the privatised firm exercises 
market power. The other ratios reflect the utilisation of fixed and working 
capital and labour and are much less ambiguous, even where there 1s a 
change in the rationale of the organisation. It was never an objective of a 
pub1 ic sector organisation to waste resources, while waste threatens 
survival under private ownership. 
A further point related to objectives concerns the ‘effectiveness’ of 
service delivery. Financial performance may rise but this could be at the 
expense of a reduction in the quality of service. In a private competitive 
market a decline in the quality of output leads to a loss of market share, 
but this will not occur where there is a monopoly supplier. Unfortunately, 
only a small number of organisations provided details of service 
effectiveness in their annual reports or elsewhere and in no cases in a 
comparable way for before and after a status change. Hence, it was not 
possible to test whether financial performance improvements occurred at the 
expense of service quality. Nevertheless, this is not a major limitation of 
our study for our sample of organisations is drawn largely from departments 
and firms which produced and sold products in a competitive market or to 
government. The major exceptions to this are London Transport and the Post 
Office’s postal and telecommunications businesses. 
Finally, trends in the level of macroeconomic activity could be reflected 
in the time series data used. For example, the sudden downturn in the 
economy in 1980-81 led to a rise in stocks and debtors and a fall in 
prof 1 tab1 1 I ty in the economy. This should be borne in mind when 
interpreting our results. 
2.3 The organisations studied 
The orgq:ations studied were the Post Office postal and telecommunications 
businesses; Her Majesty’s Stationery Off ice; the Royal Ordnance Factories; 
British Aerospace; Rolls Royce (aero and marine engines); the National 
Freight Corporation (later Consortium); London Transport; and British 
Airways. They were chosen to represent a cross-section of organisations 
which altered their status within government or across the public-private 
boundary between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. They lnc lude 
organisations which changed from control by a government department to 
trading fund or public corporation status, as well as enterprises which 
experienced a change of ownership (from public to private or vice versa). 
The organisations, the status changes studied, the dates of the relevant 
status changes and the direction of the expected change in efficiency are 
summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 here 
The Post Office postal and telecommunications services were controlled by a 
government department in the UK until 1969 when control was devolved to a 
public corporation. From well before this date, however, the postal and 
telecommunications activities had separate accounts and str.xtures. In 
addition they were subject to different forms of technologicai change with 
implications for their costs of production. The financial performance of 
the two businesses, which were finally divided with the formation of 
British Telecom in 1971, are studied separately in this paper. 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Off ice (HMSO> and the Royal Ordnance Factories 
changed from being directly controlled by government departments to being 
trading funds, under the 1973 Government Trading Funds Act, at various 
dates between 1974 and 1980. This meant that these organisations were no 
longer financed out of parliamentary votes and appropriations but became 
self-financing with a greater degree of managerial independence and 
responsibility. As trading funds they were expected to operate as 
commercial enterprises and were set profit objectives. Their employees, 
however, continued to be civil servants and subject to the pay and 
cond!tions of the civil service. Trading funds were intended as a half-way 
house between direct departmental control and the ’ arm’s length’ 
relationship supposedly asociated with public corporations (Morrison, 
1933). They were expected to provide efficient management of resources 
whlle retaining political accountability. 
In the 1970s both British Aerospace and Rolls Royce moved from the private 
to the public sector and in the 1980s back to the private sector. The 
British Aerospace Corporation was established by the merger of three 
companies - Hawker Siddeley Ltd. (Aviation and Dynamics>, British Aircraft 
(Holdings> Ltd. and Scottish Aviation Ltd. - under the Aircraft and 
Shipbui ldings Act, 1977. The Corporation was subsequently privatised in 
February 1981 when 51.6 percent of the shares in the newly formed British 
Aerospace Plc were sold to private shareholders, UT iers in the industry 
and management . The remainder of the shares was sold by government in May 
1985. As the government was committed from 1981 not to interfere in the 
management of the business, 1981 is treated as the date of the status 
change . 
Rolls Royce was taken into the public sector in February 1971 following a 
financial debacle caused principally by major cost overruns in the 
development of the RB 211 series engine (Department of Trade and Industry, 
1973) t Although not formally nationalised, Rolls Royce became accountable 
+ *o the Department of Trade and later to the National Enterprfse Board in 
the way that public corporations are generally accountable to government. 
In May 1987 the company was privatised by a public flotation of shares. As 
this occurred relatively recently there are insufficient data to draw 
reliable conclusions about the effect of this event upon performance. The 
study of organisational change is therefore limited to the state takeover 
ln 1971, 
The bank-supported worker and management buy-out of the National Freight 
Corporation in February 1982 as the National Freight Consortium has often 
been cited as one of the most successful privatisations of the 1980s. It 
was also the first and for a long time the only example of privatisation by 
this method, The NFC was included in our sample to see whether performance 
improved as dramatically as the appreciation in share values suggests (an 
over 80 fold rise between February 1982 and the public flotation in 
February 1989). 
A further member of the sample 1s London Transport which, unlike the other 
organisations studied, was not affected by a change in legal status, It 
remained a public corporation throughout the period studied. However, in 
1970 it became accountable to the Greater London Council (GLC), whereas 
previously it had been overseen by the Department of Transport. London 
Transport remained under the control of the GLC until 1984 and during this 
period it was affected by political intervention aimed at taking greater 
account of social goals or externalities (e.g. the ‘fair fares’ policy). 
From 1984, London Regional Transport has operated as a public corporation 
once again accountable to central government and with a renewed comm1tmer.t 
to commercial objectives. 
Finally, British Airways CBA) was included to test for ‘anticipaticn 
effects’ . Although it was not privatised until 1987, the original decision 
to sell-off parts of BA was announced by the Conservative Party before the 
1979 General Election and a formal timetable for privatisation was 
established in 1980. In 1981 Lord King was made chairman of BA with a brief 
to prepare the business for early privatisation. Subsequently a slump in 
the airline market, followed by a drawn out legal dispute in the USA 
associated with the collapse of Laker Airways, led to privatisation being 
postponed. Given the firm intention to privatise, however, we would expect 
to find a change in the behaviour of management reflected in superior 
financial performance from 1979/80, especially after allowing for the 
effects of the airline recession. 
Our basic hypothesis is that performance (P> is a function of 
organisational status (0) and other influences <eg. competition; the 
external economic environment) Z; 
P = f (0, Z) 
The main arguments supporting the view that efficiency rises as production 
1s moved away from political control and towards the private sector can be 
found in the public choice and property rfghts literature (Parker, 1985; 
Mitchell, 1988; Dunsire, ef. al., 1988). Public choice theorists argue that 
public ownership leads to waste and inefficiency as outputs are biased 
toward political goals and inputs are under-utilised. From an economic 
point of view, not only may production be technically inefficient, in the 
sense that product ion is lower than the maximum achievable with given 
combinations of factors of production; but also factors may not be employed 
in a way which is price efffcfent. This is illustrated in Figure 2 where 
&is an isoquant showing levels of equal output but employing different 
combinations of factors of production. Suppose that the organisation 1s 
producing output inefficiently and is at point D. Assuming constant returns 
to scale, the organisation’s technical efficiency (TE> is measured as: 
TE = OB/OD 
Only when thls ratio is unity (production takes place on the isoquant) is 
the organisation achieving full technical efficiency. However, this is not 
equivalent to economic efficiency since the organisation is not employing 
optimal amounts of factors of production X and Y given their current prices 
and current technology. The point of price efficiency is where the budget 
1 ine (which expresses how much of X and Y can be purchased with a firm’s 
current budget for factors of production and thus reflects the relative 
prices of X and Y> is tangential to the isoquant, Q0 (i.e. point C). Price 
efficiency (PE) is therefore measured by the ratio: 
, - I 
PE = OA/OB 
When this ratio is unity, the firm is employing factors of production 
efficiently. 
Combining the technical and price efficiency measures, economic efffciency 
(EE) can be defined as: 
EE = TE. PE = OA/OD 
Figure 2 here 
1 
_____---------------- 
Advocates of privatisation maintain that the profit motive ‘leads to 
economic efficiency, In contrast, nationalised concerns are popularly (if 
not always fairly) associated with economic inefficiency. As one of the 
leading advocates of privatisation commented early in the Conservative 
Government’s term of office: ‘Nationalised industries are immunised from 
the process of spontaneous change which competition and fear of bankruptcy 
impose upon the private sector’ (Sir Keith Joseph, January 1980). It is 
argued that with the possibility of bankruptcy and the abi llty to benefit 
directly from higher profits through higher pecuniary incomes, private 
sector management monitor the activities of employees and utilisation of 
capi ta1 more effectively so as to achieve high technical and price 
efficiency (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). An example might be the National 
Freight Consortium since the management and worker buy-out, 
Pub1 ic limited companies, which are the obvious alternative to public 
enterprises, also face the threat of takeover by more efficient management 
if they lose the confidence of their shareholders. The competitive capital 
market or market for ‘property rights’ in the private sector is said to act 
as an important and effective constraint upon managerial non-profit 
maximising behaviour (Alchian, 1965). In contrast, in the public sector 
there are no transferable property rights, no takeover threat, management 
is salaried rather than ;aid according to profits, and the Exchequer exists 
as a lender of last resort. Therefore, it is argued that public enterprises 
are intrinsically less efficient than private firms because they do not 
face the discipline of a competitive, private capital mar :t. It follows 
that ‘denationalisation restores market disciplines’ (Heald and Steel, 
1986, p.68). The fact that in the run-up to privatisation firms must create 
‘a commercial track record’, imp1 ies that under public ownership they did 
not have such a record (Hyman, 1988, p, 126). 
Efficiency will often be most at risk where there is direct political 
control since the organisation is likely to be managed with a view to 
meeting political and social objectives. Hence as we move away from direct 
departmental control to provision through trading funds and public 
corporations we would expect efficiency to increase. Certainly, the 
rationale behind establishing public corporations was precisely to limit 
political intervention, introduce commercial goals and provide incentives 
for manager I al efficiency Morrison, 1933). Similarly, governments, 
Conservative and Labour, have justified the establishment of trading funds 
and other agencies on the same grounds. Stephen Littlechild, however, warns 
in relation to organisations which retain some government ownership that 
1 I I . . as long as ultimate control lies WI th government, one cannot 
realistically hope to avoid all the problems,, . . ..‘(Littlechild. 1981, 
p, 14) * It seems that full efficiency gains require full privatisation. This 
paper uses financial perfc Lance ratios as indicators of efficiency. 
Qur central hvoothesis is therefore that as ornanisations in the public 
pecto mo !- ve away from direct nolitical control and Excheauer financing 
towards more i&eDendent and commercial iv-minded management f inane la! 
se is exDected to imbrove, This should show up particularly when 
an organisation is privatised but should also be evident even when 
organisations remain in the public sector and achieve an ‘arm’s length’ 
relationship from government (for a fuller discussion of the central 
hypothesis and its rationale see Dunsire et.al., 1988). 
Turning specifically to the financial performance ratios, their expected 
direct ions of change, based on the central hypothesis, are summarised in 
Table 2. In general, the expectation is that financial performance will 
have improved in those organisations which moved away from direct political 
control and deteriorated in those organisations which moved towards more 
political control. The use of a number of financial ratios, however, raises 
a problem of interpretation. It may not follow that all the ratios move in 
a consistent manner. Some may suggest improved efficiency, while others 
imply a decline in efficiency or appear to be unaffected by the status 
change. This will be commented upon further when the results are reported. 
Also, a further limitation lies in the use of financial ratios to reflect 
changes in economic efficiency. Financial ratios may not adequately capture 
economic efficiency as defined earlier. They do, however, provide some 
insight into how well an organisation is minimising its costs of production 
for any given output and the results in this paper complement earlier 
productivity results (Parker and Hartley, 1990; Hartley, Parker and Martin, 
1990) * 
4. Statist ical method 
The statistical results for each of the performance measures are presented 
at two levels. Initially, average figures for the four years before and the 
four years following the status change are reported. A four year period was 
selected as this seemed to provide a long enough perlod to capture ’ leads’ 
and ’ lags’ in performance changes, but was not so long that there was a 
major risk of reflecting performance effects that were independent of the 
status change. However, where the four year averages appeared to be unduly 
distorted by ‘freak’ years or where there was a secular improvement or 
deterioration in performance immediately either side of these periods, this 
is discussed. 
The possibility exists that a rise in average performance is not 
statistically significant. Also, the four year averages might merely 
reflect long-term trends in performance independent of the status, change. 
For example, higher average profitability in the four years following a 
status change might simply reflect a continuing upward trend in 
profitability which was unaffected by the status change. To test for this, 
an analysis of covariance model was used which took the general form: 
Yi = a t b,, t DV + m, 
where Y, is a vector of performance measures; t is time; DV is a binary 
(or dummy) variable CO,11 for the ‘status change; and m, is a normally 
distributed error term with a mean value of zero and a constant conditional 
variance. The dummy indicates by how much the mean value of Y, changes with 
the status change, with other factors affecting performance over time 
reflected in the time trend, t (for further details of the method see 
Kmenta, 1971, pp. 409-30) * The coefficient on DV was then subjected to a t 
test for significance. Each financial ratio was regressed against time and 
the binary variable for status change, or where an organisation underwent 
two relevant status changes in our period two binary variables 
appropriately defined. In all cases care was taken to identify 
multicollinearity between time. and the binary variable. Where this proved 
to “be a problem, a two stage process was adopted in which the performance 
ratios were regressed first against time and then if the time variable was 
statistically insignificant against the dummy variable separately. Also, an 
interaction dummy was subsequently applied to the time variable and where 
this helped to clarify the direction of change the result is reported. 
5. The 
Four year averages for before and after the status change”for each of the 
performance measures are reported in Table 3 and the analysis of covariance 
results are reported in Table 4.* 
Beginning with London Transport, our central hypothesis predicts that the 
status change from central government accountability to control by the GLC 
in 1970 should have led to a deterioration in financial performance. 
Similarly, the further change in status in 1984 in the reverse direction 
should have led to an improvement in performance. However, our four year 
averages suggest that after 1969 all of the financial ratios improved. 
There was a lower rate of increase in the stocks ratio, a fall in the 
debtors and wages ratios and an improvement in sales to fixed assets, 
profitability and value added per employee. Testing this using the 
covariance model confirms the improvement for the stocks ratio (though only 
at the i0 U, level) but not for debtors where the dummy variable, DVl, is 
statistically insignificant. Analysis of the data confirms that the result 
for the debtors ratio occurs because of sharp fluctuations in the ratio in 
the early to mid-1970s. This was highlighted when an interaction binary 
term was applied to the time trend along with the usual binary dummy. The 
result was a negative and significant status change dummy (-0.23DV1, 
____________________------------------------------------------------------ 
t All dates refer to the accounting year ending in that calendar year. For 
example, for the HMSO 1977-80 refers to the accounting periods year ending 
31 March 1977 to year ending 31 March 1980. 
t=z. 14) with a positive and significant interaction term (O.OlDVlt, 
t=2.301* Similarly, the dummies in the equations for the growth of value 
added and the wages to expenditure rat 10s are not statistically 
signif icant. The covariance results for value added reflect the slow growth 
in value added between 1974 and 1979 (figure in parenthesis Table 3) and 
for wages, a stagnant wages ratio for much of the 1970s. The fixed assets 
ratio improved over time but was not significantly affected by the status 
change. As for profitability, there is no evidence of any trend over time; 
nor is there any indication of a signif icant improvement in profitability 
associated with the status change. 
Moving to the 1984 status change for London Transport, the averages in 
Table 3 confirm the expected improvement in performance in terms of stocks, 
wages and sales to fixed assets but not in terms of of debtors, 
profitability and value added. The analysis of covariance results (DV2 
Table 4) confirm the improvement for sales to fixed assets and stocks but 
not for wages, where the decline in the ratio appears to be the result of a 
long term trend independent of status changes. In the case of the fixed 
assets ratio the improved performance at the time of the status change was 
followed by a slight deterioration. This was captured by introducing an 
interaction dummy which had a negative coefficient and was statistically 
signif icant (2.43 DV2, t=3.16, -0.03 DV2t, t=3,11. ). Also, the covariance 
results show that the second status change was associated with the expected 
improvement in the debtors ratio. The debtors ratio rose after 1983 but 
fell from 1986 and this is reflected in the results. Turning to value 
added, the average percentage figures and the covariance result are 
affected by a large improvement in performance in the two years before the 
status change and a deterioration in 1985. Comparing the periods 1978-81 
and 1982-86, there was a sharp rise in value added per employee (figures in 
parenthesis Table 3). 
Further investigation of the performance measures which appear to have 
moved contrary to expectation or which appear to have been unaffected by 
the 1984 status change reveals that London Transport’s performance began to 
improve from 1980 and deteriorated slightly in 1984/85. Since the 
corporation was not earmarked for reorganisation as early as 1980 the 
improvement was possibly a feature of the ‘Thatcher factor’, which seems to 
have led to a general improvement in the performance of public enterprises 
in terms of productivity and profitability (H. M. Treasury, 1987). However, 
this improvement does not appear to have produced the expected improvement 
in profitability. 
For the HMSO which became a trading fund in 1980, the stocks ratio and 
profitability improved as our central hypothesis predicts, but the other 
ratios moved contrary to expectation. Indeed, the analysis of covariance 
procedure suggests that the status change caused a statistically 
significant deterioration in the debtors and wages ratios. However, earlier 
analysis of productivity in the HMSO (Parker and Hartley, 1990) has 
revealed that economic performance in the HMSO improved sharply from 1982 
not 1980. This was also the case for the debtors and wages ratios, implying 
some delay in management getting to grips with costs. The averages for 
1983-86 are shown in Table 3 in parentheses. In the case of sales to fixed 
assets, the status change appears not to have reversed a general 
deterioration in performance over the period studied. Also, the sharply 
improved rate of return on capital was not sustained to the end cf our 
period. By 1987 it had returned to its pre-1980 level; the deterioration is 
reflected in the negative coefficient on the time trend variable (Table 4). 
The National Freight Corporation’s transfer to the private sector in 1981 
had been hailed as ‘perhaps the greatest quantifiable success story in the 
privatisation programme’ (Veljanovski, 1987, p. 136). The results in Tables 3 
and 4 confirm a rise in profitability after the status change and this 
prompted the sharp appreciation in the price of NFC equity in the 1980s. 
There was also an improvement in the use of labour as reflected in the 
wages ratio and the covariance result for wages/expenditure. However, 
initially value added per employee deteriorated, as evident from thi 
figures in Table 3, and the subsequent recovery (figure in parenthesis) 
appears to be part of a longer-term trend rather than related to the 
status change, In general, value added-rose over time as reflected by the 
coefficient on the time trend variable in the covariance model, Turning to 
the other ratios and their relationship to privatisation, the change in the 
debtor ratio was not statistically significant, while there was some 
suggestion that the trend in the stocks to sales and net fixed assets 
ratios actually deteriorated. 
In the case of the Post Office telecommunications and postal businesses, 
transfer from government department control to public corporation status in 
1969 was intended to lead to improved performance. This is not borne out, 
however, for the telecommunications business. The sales to net fixed 
assets, value added per employee and profitability ratios rose over the 
period studied but seem to have been broadly unaffected by the status 
change (Table 4). Also, the average for the debtors ratio (Table 3) was 
biased downwards by an especially good performance in the year to March 
1972, in the previous two years following the status change the debtors 
ratio had risen (figure in parenthesis). This is reflected in the analysis 
of covariance results where the status change dummy is positive, though 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. There is evidence that the 
status change was associated with a lower wages ratio as expected. 
In the postal business the wages ratio, which was rising throughout most of 
the the period studied, also fell immediately following the status change, 
but this improvement proved temporary. The ratio began to rise again from 
1971 I The sales to fixed assets ratio which rose over time actually 
deteriorated in the years immediately after 1969. In contrast, the stocks 
ratio seems to have declined as expected and the profitability and value 
#added per employee ratios seem to have been unaffected by the status 
change (Table 4). 
British Airways was included in the sample of organisations specifically to 
test for anticipation effects. Interestingly, all of the ratios in Table 3 
show a marked improvement in performance following the 1980 announcement of 
future privatisation, with one important exception, namely profitability. 
However, in the early 198Os, average profitability was reduced by a loss in 
the year to March 1981 at the height of the airlines recession. Taking the 
years 1982-85, the average rate of return soars to 21.2 per cent and value 
added per employee increased by an average rate of 3.3 percent per annum, 
after declining in earlier years (figures in parentheses Table 3). The 
analysis of covariance results support the view that the anticipation of 
privatisation led to a rise in overall performance especially after 1983, 
once British Airways had adjusted to diffcult trading conditions. None of 
the financial rat 10s deteriorated and improvements in the stocks, 
profitability and value added ratios appear to have been associated with 
the status change. 
According to our central hypothesis the state takeover of Rolls Royce early 
in 1971 should have led to a deterioration in performance. In fact, 
performance improved. There is some uncertainty about the the stock ratio 
but when the ratio is correlated with time as well as a dummy for the 
status change (Table 4) it appears to have improved. Almost all of the 
other ratios changed contrary to expectation with only the rise in the 
sales to fixed assets ratio not identified with the state takeover. At 
first blush it appears, therefore, that the Rolls Royce case completely 
contradicts our central hypothesis. The improved performance may, however, 
be explained by the nature of the state takeover, which arose out of the 
financial collapse of Rolls Royce. The parlous state of the company’s 
finances necessitated a major overall of its practices. Also, the improved 
performance did not last. From the mid-1970s a number of indicators 
deteriorated. Taking the four accounting years ending 1975 to 1978 the 
average ratios were as follows: 
X change in stocks/turnover t7.6 
% change in debtors/turnover -4,5 
% wages/expenditure 34.5 
Sales/net fixed assets 7.3 
X rate of return on capital t3.6 
X change in value added to. 1 
Turning to the Royal Ordnance Factories, the introduction of trading fund 
status was expected to lead to an improvement in financial performance and 
this occurred. With the except ion of the wages to expend1 ture ratio, al 1 
other indicators registered statistically significant improvements 
following the status change. 
Finally, British Aerospace underwent two relevant status changes, namely 
nationalisation in 1977, where a fall in performance is predicted, and 
privatisation from 1981, which should have led to a performance recovery. 
The results, however, provide a confusing picture. The four year averages 
reported in Table 3 suggest that the stocks rat 10 rose following 
nationalisation and declined albeit marginally after privatisation, as 
expected, and that the debtors ratio also improved after 1981. But the 
analysis of covariance results in Table 4 do not support these conclusions. 
Also, in Table 3 with the exception of value added the other ratios moved 
contrary to expectation. Profitability, sales to fixed assets and wages to 
expenditure all improved after nationalisation and after 1981 profitability 
actually declined. The improvement in the wages ratio after 1977 does 
appear to be statistically signif icant but the other results are not 
supported Ln the covariance model (Table 4). The failure of British 
Aerospace to raise profitability after privatisation in 1981 is at first 
surprising but might be explained by launching costs for civil aircraft 
development and tighter cost control on Ministry of Defence contracts in 
the 1980s. Finally, the improvement in sales to fixed assets and value 
added per employee rat 10s identif led in Table 3 appear to be more 
associated with trends over time than either of the two status changes. 
Table 5 summarises the results for the nine organisations based on the 
covariance results. In terms of the central hypothesis few ratios changed 
contrary to expectation though a large number were unaffected by the status 
change. To provide a guide, albeit crude, to the overall impact in each 
case, each of the financial ratios has been weighted equally to derive the 
‘Net Total’ column. Where performance improved measured by a particular 
rat lo, this was given a figure of 1. Where it deteriorated a figure of -1. 
A net total of greater than zero therefore means that more financial ratios 
improved rather than deteriorated. A figure of zero means that improvements 
in some rhtios were offset by a deterioration in an equal number of ratios. 
A negative total means that more ratios deteriorated than improved. Only 
the privatised British Aerospace has a negative net total contrary to 
expectation and in this case only because of a deterioration in the stocks 
rat lo. As indicated earlier in this study, changes in stocks and debtors 
ratios should be treated with special care as the direction of change 
associated with an improvement or deterioration in performance is not 
certain. An alternative view is to interpret any change, in whatever 
direction, in the stocks and debtors ratios as evidence of improved 
performance. The final column in Table 5 adopts this approach. 
It is important to stress that the ‘Net Total’ is merely a crude guide for 
it implies an equal Weighting of ratios. Obviously, this is controversial. 
Referring to the ratios structure in Figure 1, profitability lies at the 
apex and the other ratios shed light upon the source of any changes in 
profitabil,ity. Therefore 1 t can be argued that profitability should be 
taken as the key measure of financial performance. It should not be 
weighted equal1 y. The problem in adopting such an approach, however, lies 
with Changes in objectives, a subject already discussed. All of our sample 
spent at least some time in the public sector where other goals may have 
been more important than profitability. Changes in performance measured 
mainly in terms of Changes in profitability could therefore reflect changes 
in objectives. By looking equally at the other financial ratios, a more 
complete appraisal of performance is obtained and one not so obviously 
biased by objectives. Nonetheless, it will be noted from Table 5 that in 
five of our cases profitability improved (although for Rolls Royce contrary 
to expectation) and in no cases did it decline following the status change* 
6. Conclusions 
Our central hypothesis was drawn from the public choice and property rights 
11 terature and reflects the rationale behind the actions of governments in 
the 1980s in privatising public sector assets and in establishing agencies 
within government. The hypothesis stated that removfng the provision of 
goods and services from direct pol I t ical control improves economic 
performance. This was tested using a number of standard performance 
measures based upon accounting ratios for a sample of nine organisations 
which had experienced status changes between the 1960s and 1980s. 
The financial ratios did not provide a consistent set of statistically 
significant results for any of our organisations. This in itself is 
interesting for it suggests that studies which test for performance changes 
using only a narrow base of financial performance measures, notably 
profitability (cf. Hamilton, 1971), must be interpreted with care. The 
results may be biased by the performance measures selected for study. 
Despite the lack of consistency, however, it does appear that overal 1 our 
hypothesis was supported by the results of the organisational changes wh!ch 
affected London Transport in 1984, the Post Off ice postal service and more 
especially, British Airways 2nd the Royal Ordnance Factories. In Contras:, 
the picture for the HMSO and the Post Office telecommunications business is 
less clear, while the results for London Transport in 1970, British 
Aerospace in 1976 and more especially Rolls Royce are contrary to 
expectation. In the latter case, however, the ‘shock effect’ of the 197: 
financial collapse and the need to rebui Id the company’s finances rather 
than state takeover may well have produced the marked improvement in almost 
all of the financial ratios studied. From the mid-1970s there was a 
noticeably sharp decline in the performance of Rolls Royce which may 
reflect a delayed effect of state control. The perverse results for British 
Aerospace are more difficult to explain, although they may reflect changes 
in the terms of government defence contracts and stages in product 
development. 
Organisational status changes in the direction of privatisation do not 
appear, therefore, to guaran tee improved performance nor does 
nationalisation, it seems, necessari 1 y worsen performance in terms of the 
financial ratios studied. Performance appears to result from a complex set 
of factors and not simply ownership; a vie&hat will not seem as strange 
to organisational theorists as to public choice and property rights 
economists (Perry and Rainey, 1988). This conc!usion has obvious relevance 
to public policy in the UK and elsewhere at a time of major reorganisation 
in the public sector. Also, our findings suggest that a future research 
agenda should address what these other factors are that affect performance. 
If establishing agencies within government and privatisation are not 
sufficient, what other changes should be instituted at the time of 
organisational change - perhaps more compet 1 t ion, new management or 
incentive-type employment contracts? Here there is scope for researching 
what happens at the organisational level wf thin firms if we are truly to 
understand the impact of organisational status upon performance. 
Figure 1 
Structure of Ratios 
Manageriai Performance 
Rate of return on 
cap1 ta1 
Management of 
.WOrking Capital 
I 
I I 
Debt Inventory 
collection policy 
Management 
of fixed cap ital 
Sales/fixed 
assets 
Labour costs 
and value 
added 
$7 --+-a 2 
3 
i 
i 
Table 1 misational Status Channes 
Type of Change Date Prediction of change Organisation 
government department 
to public 
corporation 
April 1960 
in efficiency 
Improvement 
government department 
to public 
corporation 
April 1969 Improvement 
government department 
to trading fund 
April 1980 improvement 
government department 
to trading fund 
July 1974 Improvement 
April 1977 Deterioration 
public corporation to 
public limited 
company 
Feb. 1981 Improvement 
Feb. 1971 Deterioration 
public corporation to 
pub1 ic limited 
company 
Feb. 1982 Improvement 
public corporation 
to (local) 
government department 
Jan. 1970 Deterioration 
June 1984 Improvement 
public corporation to From 1979 Improvement 
(anticipatory, 
Post Office 
postal 
Post Office 
tele- 
communications 
HMSO 
Rcval Ordnance 
British Aerospace public limited 
company to 
public corporation 
British Aerospace 
Rolls Royce public limited 
company to 
public corporation 
National Freight 
Corporation 
London Transport 
London Transport (local> government 
department to 
pub1 ic corporation 
British Airways 
public limited 
company 
Table 2 
A 
Financial ratio; Expect ratio to: 
Profit/net assets Fall Rise 
Sales/net fixed assets Fall Rise 
Stocks/sales Rise Fall <l’ 
Debtors/sales Rise Fall cl) 
Wages/expenditure Rise Fall 
Value added per employee Fall Rise 
u applies to those organisations which our central hypothesis 
predicts would have suffered a deterioration in financial performance 
following the status change studied i,e. Rolls Royce (1971>, London 
Transport (1970) and British Aerospace (1977). 
Column B applies to those organisations which our central hypothesis 
predicts would have experienced an improvement’ in financial performance 
following the status change studied i.e. London Transport (19841, British 
Aerospace (1981), National Freight Consortium (19721, Post Office postal 
and telecommunications services (19691, HMSO (19801, the Royal Ordnance 
Factories (1974) and British Airways (from 1979). 
(1) The direction of change in the stocks and debtors ratios signalling an 
improvement or deterioration in performance is not clear. This point is 
taken up in the conclusions to the study. 
4 AI E VI v1 -40 G r: 1 ;; u-l 
b L-l L-l ;rb b ;u Lll b b, -En 
N 
L 
J m b oa x z, 
i 45 5; 
% -* 
z ’ a 
0 3 -4 N 0 
b 0 b b L 
N 
b 
r; J zw 0 Lch 
L b Lb, Y ;ukJ 
e % 
2: 
-4 
$ f K 21 
b b :: x 
B 
Zf -* (D 
2 : 
2‘ 
0 * s: 0 0 
LA 
is 
L ;( 
ii 
> 5: 
VI 
m’ 
2 UJ 
f 0 
CL- 
- 2 
K * 
0 * 0 0 m %T 
&I Ll b ;D 
2;: 
w a 
0) 
VI Yyl ;u Lc b. 
% 
0) -4 
b 
N N 
L iA 
Y -4 
v 
0 6 b 
i- h -I I 
B 
N 
0 
iv b 
‘3! 
0 
2 
0 
l 
2 
;I kl 
- m 
b 
2 -4 N- we *d m 
b bi- Lb ;u 
-iIn -L 
w 2: 
in L 
? ,cr 
0 
aI $r, 1 I VI 
> 
2 I - 
N * 
iA 
w w 
;n ;u 
N VI 
L k N 
A h 
00 N N OUl W& WI 
iv ;u Ltc Lb. b 
Yn -4 
P mnJ 
b LL! 
Yn 
A-A- 
-. 4. d. -. 
5 -. d. Y -. ” 
wm 
: z. 0 - 
g$ 
p: m  
P m  -. 7 d. z - s g 
jq 
a- 0 
--n 
hT z’3 -0 
a 
%  9 y 2 
: 
Y-T 
-. 
i: n 3 
z 2 :z 
5 E -. 5 c 
z is3 s -. -. -* 0 -h al 3 p: ;;’ id 
42 al 
x 4. 22 
zzz:, 2 
z:f. -G -*WP d. ; 0 -c -. 10 0 
-2 2 N 
- -7 a 
!i% : 
4. 0 l -. 
%  a3 2 
0 2. c 
OU 
3-O 
0 -. c 
D-h0 
- -. 0 
gg 3 
: 
0 
ID al 
* 
A 0 
00 
$4 
-6 I . 
3: 
06 
. I 
-40 
N- 
NO 
Lb 
J3 -* 
NO 
bb 
yQ$ 
-6 
bb 
Zf 
3 3 
‘m  L 
00 
Lb o- 
-b . . 
zz -* 
* 
z 
z N 
* 
0 5 
P N 
* 
0 
5 
0 
5 
* 
s 
0 
5 
* 
P 
z 
N 
0 
0 
5 
00 . . ys: 
N& b ‘* 
cv, 
Nb 
;;4 
Y l 
N& 
‘g $ 
Y l 
13 . . m  D 
NO 
b b 
y”g 
A I 
NO 
$9 
Y * 
n I 
NO 
. . 
ZIR 
Y * 
, , I I I I 
A a 
00 
5s 
00 
$9 
WO 
-b 
o- 
” * 
J 3 
h, br 
J J 
L ;P 
O&l 
k4 
00 
b b 
N- 
-0 GO 
Lb Lb 
y”g ?z- 
WO 
$1 
$2 
* 
J 
h, 
a J 
b, hr 
s 
T  
d 
- 
?a 
2. a 
3. 
f: 0 
2 
%  
0 
x 
z 
d 
I 
-0 
-b 
UlW 
I I wo . . 
48 
- 3 
-0 
. . 
-JO 
** 
Iv;3 
$25 
: 
CI I 
-0 
Lb 
ww 
WO 
* . 
E% 
: 
-0 
kc. 
ww 
N6 
&k 
Y * 
ow . I 
fzzg 
e I 
NW s (0 3’ >s 
5; 2 -. 
. 
z5 2% 
2. v) 
00 
-b 
o- 
-0 . . 
31s -a 
00 
b b m-4 
-40 . . 
212 
Y * 
* 
00 
k-k 
NO 
$ $ 
: 
agz 4. -2 2 M . 
:: 2 ): a e PO 8-n 
z-2; z:=g 
NN 
&$ 
A I 
00 
$ b 
** 
I 1 I  I  I I NO 
. . 
** 
-& * . 
-40 
z?T; 
-0 
bb 
v”; 
0-2 
L b 
0- 
wo 
;n b 
N- 
: 
00 
. . 
VO 
** 
Wb 
&k 
: 
4-O 
L ‘* 
2’; 
I( 
Y z -. 
P  P  -. -. 
< 
NO 
;u-. 
,o‘(: 
h 6 
00 
Lb 
Y- 
00 
*g 4 
00 
Lb w- 
I I , I 
NO 
;I& 
*- 
Y * 
U-t0 
. . 
22 
: 
A I 
00 
. . 
-40 
0.d 
h 
EO 
Lb 
O.- 
: 
00 
$4 
3 3 
h, b 
CnO 
b b 
0- 
Y l 
00 
Ob 
*A 
-& 
- b 
** 
NO 
<4 
” l 
-0 
kii 
3 1 
‘p, b 
* , . I 
gL-sLfjL Jo) a6eJaAe 8 
SQ-286L JO) a6eJaAe L 
LL-696~ .q a6eJaAe 9  
9g-sg6L 434 a6eJaAe s 
9Q-‘3(,1 -101 a6eJsAe ‘I 
98-2&5L Jo) a6eJaAe s 
lij-QL,5L JO) a6CJJAC 2 
t5L-‘1L,5l JO4 a6CJJAe 1 
a3vln31m 01 elcp w3!3!)insu! sa,eJ!pu! e/u 
a6uctp snle*s JalJe s~cd 9 6 
a6uctp snle3s aJoji3q SJL’d ‘I \I 
(A!) 
(!!!I 
(!!I 
(1) 
alqel!eAs lou :e/u 
1861  a3edsoJay 1$3!l!~g a6ueq3 ON 
a6uer(3 0N 
paAOJdIU1 
aSue on 
a6ueq3 ON 
paaeJo! 
-Jaaaa 
a6ueq3 ON 
PX!W 
a6ue43 ON 
paAOJdlli l  
a6ueq3 on 
,,“‘>A 
PX!W 
a6ueq3 0N 
~AOJdlUl 
paAOJd”I 1 
PJAO J&l I 
a6uel(3 ON 
a6ueqa ON 
paAOJciuI 
paAOJdUll  
paAOJ& I 
a6ueqz ON 
paAOJdUll  
aluel(l ON 
paAOJdUiI 
a6ueq3 ON 
paAOJChll l  
paAOJChl1 
paAOJ&ll  
paaem! 
-Jaaaa 
a6ueq3 ON 
a6ueyD ON 
9L6l 
'1L6L 
LL6L  
0861  
a6uet(J ON 
a6ueqa ON 
paAOJdL”l 
paAOJdlUI 
pJA0.h 1 
a6ueqa ON 
e/u 
e/u 
paAOJdUll  
aLuuq3  ON 
a3edsoJav qs!l!~g 
Sk!HJ!V i,‘!)!JB 
lE>Sod 
a3!440 lsod 
suo!~e~~unuumalaa 
aJ!t&O lsod 
a6ueqJ ON e/u 
paleJo! 
-Jaaaa 
paAOJ&lfuI 6961  atiuer(D ON 1  1  
a6ueqa ON e/u 
paaeJo! 
-Jaaaa 
6961 2  0  aSue ON 
1 InsaJ 
a6uaq3 ON PaAOJdlll 1  a6ueq3 ON 
paleJo! 
-Jaaaa 
2861  f 1  
paAOJdlllI PJAOJdUlI 0  e/u 086L  OSHH 
paleJo! 
-JaJaa paAOJdlllI 9861  ~JOdSUEJl UOpUOl a6ueq3 ON f L  avsaJ pax!w 
1  1  a6ueq3 ON a6uel(a ON patt0~. . OL6L 1 JOdSUaJ 1 UOpUOl 
SlUWraAOJ&! S W  SO!3eJ 
SJolqap pie sy303s 
aq3 u! a6ueq3 
AUE 6U!geaJl 
1e101 laN 
a6uag3 
ieiol O!leJ O!laJ ’ o!$eJ o!leJ o!aeJ o!leJ smels 
W N  pappe anpA h!l!qw!toJd slassv pax!4 sa6en smwaa S)13OlS 40 aiea uo!les!ue6.t0 
s11ns3tl 30 AMVHWI-IS s 3lEVl 
References 
Alchian, A. A. , 1965, ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’, I! Politico, 
~~1.30, pp.816-29. 
Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H., 1972, ‘Production, Information Costs and 
Economic Organitation’, American Economic Review, ~01.62, reproduced in 
A. A. Alchian, 1975, EconomicForces Liberty Press, Indianapolis. 
Baumol, W. J, , 1959, Business Behaviour, Value and Growth, Macmi 1 Ian, 
London. 
Bayldon, R., Woods, A. and Zaf iris, N., 1984, ‘A Note on the ‘Pyramid’ 
Technique of Financial Ratio Analysis of Firms’ Performance’, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring, pp. 99-106. 
Chester, N., 1975, TheNationalisation HMSO, 
London. 
Coombes, D., 1971, wEnterDrise, Allen and Unwin, London, 
Courtis, J. K., 1978, ‘Modelling a Financial Ratios Categoric Framework’, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, ~01.5, winter. 
Dunsire, A., Hartley, K., Parker, D. and Dim1 triou, B., 1988, 
‘Organitational Status and Performance: a conceptual framework for testing 
pub1 ic choice theories’ , Pub1 ic Administration, vol. 66, no. 4, winter, 
pp. 363-88. 
Eilon, S., 1979, ‘Some Useful Ratios in Evaluating Performance’, Qmena: Tha 
International Journal of Manqnement Science, ~01~7, no.2, pp. 166-8. 
Hamilton, N. M, , 1971, Prickina Prvke: the Facts on State Industrv, Aims of 
Industry, London. 
Hartley, K., Parker, D and Martin, S., 1989, ‘Organisational Status, 
Ownership and Productivity’, mimeo. 
Heald, D. and Steel, D., 1986, ‘Analysis of the Government’s Case’, in ed. 
J. Kay, C. Mayer and D. Thompson, Privatisation and Regulation; the UK 
bberience, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Hemming, R. and Mansoor, A.M., 1988, Privatization and Public EnterDriseq, 
Occasional Paper 66, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.. 
HMSO, 1988, -Service Reform: The mt St=, Cmnd. 524, 
London. 
H. M. Treasury, 1987, ‘Nationalised Industries’ Performance’ , Economic 
Progress Report, no. 193, December, H. M. Treasury, London. 
Hood, C., Huby, M. and Dunsire, A., 1987, ‘British Administrative Trends 
and the Pub1 ic Choice Revolution’ in ed. J.-E, Lane, Bureaucracv and Pub1 ic 
Choicg, Sage, London. 
Hyman, H.J., 1988, ‘Preparing for Privatisation: the Financial Aspects’, in 
Ramanadham, V.V., Privatisation in the UK, Routledge, London, 
Kmenta, J., 1971, Elements of Econometrics, Macmillan, London. 
Kay, J.A. and Thompson, D.J., 1986, ‘Privatisation: a Policy in Search of a 
Rationale‘, Economic Journal, vo1.96, March, pp. 18-32. 
Laurent, C. R. , 1979, ‘Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of 
Financial Ratio Analysis‘, Journal of Business Fiwce plnd Accounting, 
~01.6, no. 3, pp. 401-13. : 
Littlechild, S.C., 1981, ‘Ten Steps to Denationalisation’, Journal of 
Economic Affairs, vo1.2, no0 1, PP. 11-19. 
Marris, R. , 1964, The Ecwmic Theorv of I a_CaDitallsm’, 
Macmi 1 lan, London. 
Mayer, C., 1988, ‘The Real Value of Company Accounts’, F-s, 
vo1.9, np. 1, Feb., pp. 1-17. 
Mayston, D., 1985, ‘Non-profit Performance Indicators in the Public 
Sector’, Financial Accountabilitv and Management, vol. 1, no, 1, Summer, 
pp. 5 1-74. 
Meeks, G., 1977, DisqWQfnt!nn Marriage: a studv of the ~0s from merger, 
Cambridge UP, Cambridge. 
Xi 1 lward, R. and Parker, D., 1983, ‘Public and Private Enterprfse: 
comparative behaviour and relative efficiency’, in R. Millward, D. Parker, 
L. Rosenthal, M. T, Sumner and N. Topham, Pub1 ic Set tor Economic, Longman, 
London. 
Mitchell, W,C,, 1988, Government Hobart Paper 109, Institute of 
1 
Economic Affairs, London. 
Morrison, H.S., 1933, ebort, Constable, London. 
Xueller, M., 1979, ublic Choim, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
?arker, D., 1985, ‘Is the ?rivate Sector More Efficient? A study in th 
public v private debate’, 7ublic Administration Bulletin, ~01.48, August, 
pp. 2-23. 
Parker, D. and Hartley, K., 1990, ‘Organisational Status and Performance: 
the effects on employment’, &plled Economics (forthcoming). 
Parker, D. and Stead, R., Profit and Enterprise: Profit in Econom!c Theory, 
MIT Press, Boston, Mass.. 
Perry, J. L. and Rainey, H.G., 1988, ‘The Public-Private Distinction in 
Organizat ion Theory: A Critique and Research Strategy’, Academv of 
mt Review, vol. 13, no.2, pp.182-201. 
Pryke, R., 1971, Public Enterbrise in Practice, MacGibbon h Kee, London, 
Reid, W. and Myddel ton, D.R, , 1982, The Meaning of Companv Accounts, 3rd 
ed., Gower , Aldershot. 
Veljanovski, C., 1987, Sell&g the State, Weidenfled b Nicolson, London. 
Williamson, O.E., 1964, De Eccugmics of Discretiona! Behaviour : Mananeria 1 
ctives in the Thewy of the Fira, Prentice-Ball, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey . 
